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Abstract: Taking the good (generosity), the true (enquiry), and the beautiful 
(creativity) as exemplars of what can make a life noticeably meaningful, 
elsewhere I have advanced a principle that entails and plausibly explains all 
three. Specifically, I have proffered the view that great meaning in life, at least 
insofar as it comes from this triad, is a matter of positively orienting one’s 
rational nature towards fundamental conditions of human existence, conditions 
of human life responsible for much else about it. Iddo Landau has raised 
important objections to this principle, arguing in particular that contouring 
one’s rationality towards fundamentality is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
great meaning in life. In this article, I reply to Landau’s objections to the 
fundamentality account of what makes life very meaningful. I thereby aim to 
enrich reflection about what it is about the lives of Nelson Mandela, Mother 
Teresa, Albert Einstein, and Pablo Picasso that made them so significant as 
well as to indicate how fundamentality implicitly plays a key role in theistic 









In a previous issue of this journal, I published an article purporting to present a 
new and promising unified account of what confers great meaning on life (Metz 
2011), by which I roughly mean those contingent facets of an individual human 
person’s existence that merit emotional reactions such as substantial pride, 
admiration, and perhaps even awe (Taylor (1989), 3–90; Kauppinen (2012), 352–
355; cf. Metz (2013), 24–35). Taking the classic final values of the good (generosity), 
the true (enquiry), and the beautiful (creativity) as exemplars of what can make a life 
noticeably meaningful, I sought a principle that would entail and plausibly explain all 
three. Specifically, I advanced the view that great meaning in life, at least insofar as it 
comes from this triad, is a matter of positively orienting one’s rational nature towards 
fundamental conditions of human existence, roughly, conditions of human life 
responsible for much else about it. In a subsequent issue of this journal, Iddo Landau 
(2013)1 critically engaged with this view, raising important objections to it that have 
advanced debate about the nature of what makes life meaningful. In this article, I 
intend to take the dialectic another step or two further by replying to Landau’s 
objections to the fundamentality theory of great meaning in life. 
 Happily for me, Landau claims that I have succeeded in showing how the 
fundamentality theory avoids problems facing other, salient accounts of life’s 
meaning to be found in the literature (505) and that it is ‘much more attractive than 
others’ (512) for that reason. However, he launches new criticisms of my view, 
namely, that contouring one’s rationality towards fundamental conditions of human 
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existence is neither necessary nor sufficient for great meaning in life. With respect to 
the former, Landau points out, plausibly, that it appears that supporting merely 
necessary conditions for human existence, such as saving people’s lives, can be one 
substantial source of meaning in life. And in terms of the latter, Landau contends that 
it follows from my principle that merely understanding physical laws or works of art 
could confer great meaning on a life, whereas his hard to question intuition is that 
discovering or creating them, respectively, would be a much better candidate for that. 
These are the two claims of Landau’s that I am most concerned to address in 
this article, although I also take up some less urgent concerns of his, e.g. to the effect 
that it could be more clear what I mean by ‘fundamental’ conditions and that my 
account appears neither non-consequentialist nor essentially a matter of self-
transcendence, as I had initially characterized it. Although I am naturally keen to 
clarify the nature of my account to readers, my ultimate purpose is to enrich reflection 
about what it is about the lives of Nelson Mandela, Mother Teresa, Albert Einstein, 
and Pablo Picasso that puts them on the higher end of the spectrum with regard to 
amount of meaning in life, as well as to indicate how fundamentality implicitly plays a 
key role in theistic conceptions of it.  
 In the next section, I provide a brief overview of the fundamentality theory, 
sketching enough of it and its motivations to enable the reader to adjudicate the 
debate between myself and Landau. It is here that I explain more fully what I mean 
by ‘fundamental’, ‘non-consequentialism’, ‘self-transcendence’, and related terms that 
I had used to label the theory and why these terms still strike me as apt. Then, I take 
up Landau’s objection that positive orientation towards fundamental conditions of 
human existence could involve states that, while meaningful to some degree, are not 
to a great one. In the following section, I reply to Landau’s thoughtful criticism that 
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positive orientation towards necessary, but not fundamental, conditions of human 
existence could be meaningful to a great degree. I conclude by indicating how an 
appeal to fundamentality grounds a promising account of why, if God existed, 
devoted religious figures would have substantially meaningful lives, a view that 
secularists and naturalists have no reason to reject, but that they rarely acknowledge. 
The fundamentality theory 
The debate between me and Landau, and indeed between a large majority of 
contemporary theorists about what makes a human life meaningful, takes as 
relatively uncontroversial that certain lives have had great meaning in them in 
contrast to others. Most have presumed that the likes of Mandela, Mother Teresa, 
Einstein, and Picasso had particularly meaningful lives, even if they also had flaws, 
as human beings characteristically do. Their lives suggest that good deeds, insights, 
and artworks can confer great meaning on a life, or, more broadly, that moral action, 
intellectual reflection and aesthetic creation can do so. What, if anything, do these 
(along with other intuitive sources of meaning in life) have in common?  
A large majority of contemporary reflection among Anglo-American 
philosophers with respect to life’s meaning has been a search for a plausible answer 
to this question.2 Supernaturalists about meaning in life of course are inclined to call 
the good, the true, and the beautiful ‘spiritual’ (e.g. Steiner (1923); Cottingham 
(2005)), but on occasion one even finds a secularist doing so in light of their 
intuitively higher status, as ones beyond our own bodily pleasure (e.g. Gewirth 
(1998), 174–189). What property might unify this classic triad? My initial answer to 
this question was the following principle:  
(FT1) The good, the true, and the beautiful confer great meaning on life insofar 
as we positively orient our rational nature in a substantial way towards 
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fundamental conditions of human existence (Metz (2011), 401). 
I briefly explain what this initial version of the fundamentality theory says and then 
indicate why it is promising as a way to capture the great meaning one can obtain 
from generosity, enquiry, and creativity.  
 One can think of fundamentality in either metaphysical or epistemic terms, and 
I tend to switch back and forth between them, as they normally track each other. 
Metaphysically fundamental conditions are those (mainly, causally) responsible for a 
wide array of other conditions in a given domain, while epistemically fundamental 
propositions are those that explain a wide array of other propositions in a given 
domain.  
Let me set aside issues of meaning in life briefly, in order to illustrate with 
some intuitive examples. With regard to water, H20 is fundamental to it, whereas the 
facts that it is wet, tasteless, odourless, and the like are not. A given one of the latter 
might well be a necessary condition of water and its other properties; a substance 
probably could not be water if it lacked such a property. However, the fact that water 
is tasteless is responsible for, or explains, very little else about water, whereas the 
fact that water is H20 accounts for much, including the others mentioned above, 
making the H20 fact fundamental and the others more surface.  
 For another example to illustrate the distinction between fundamental 
conditions and ones that are not, consider the respective contributions of a janitor 
and a CEO to the operations of a business. Both are necessary tasks, in that the firm 
would cease to function, or at least efficiently, if no one were to undertake them.3 
However, only the role of the CEO is fundamental to a firm, for that position 
determines much else about the firm, unlike the position of the janitor. In explanatory 
terms, the actions taken by a CEO are an independent variable for a wide array of 
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dependent variables with respect to the company, including the janitor’s position, 
whereas that is not the case for the janitor in respect of others, such as the CEO. 
 These examples should begin to suggest that we prize fundamentality; it tends 
to be what we seek out theoretically and what we reward practically. However, when 
it comes to great meaning in life, I submit that we seek out fundamentality in 
particular domains regarding human life as such. Specifically, my suggestion is that a 
large part of what makes a person’s life particularly meaningful is that it positively 
orients her rational nature towards fundamental conditions of either a typical human 
person’s life, or the life of our species, or the environment in which we live.  
As per the above examples, a necessary condition of any of these domains is 
not essentially a fundamental one. To use a case that will be salient in the next 
section, the fact that an asteroid has not struck the earth is a necessary condition for 
much about human existence, but it is not fundamental, roughly because it causes 
and accounts for little of it.4  
In his critical discussion, Landau points out that I have not used a term to pick 
out conditions that are not fundamental (508). However, simply speaking, as Landau 
often does, of ‘non-fundamental’ or ‘derivative’ is fine, although sometimes talk of 
‘surface’ as opposed to ‘deep’, ‘disposable’ versus ‘irreplaceable’, and ‘trivial’ as 
against ‘significant’, will be apt, too. My hunch has been that such linguistically 
recurrent ways of speaking about meaningfulness point to something revealing about 
its nature qua positive orientation towards what is fundamental to human existence.  
With respect to the good, the true, and the beautiful, my account of in virtue of 
when and why they confer great meaning in life is that, at least in part, they involve 
substantial exercises of human intelligence directed towards fundamental conditions 
of human existence. Like many in the field, and with those inspired by Aristotle, 
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Aquinas, and Kant in particular, I take the exercise of our rational nature, as 
something distinct from what we share with the mineral, vegetable, and animal 
kingdoms, to be central to what makes our lives important. According to me, for great 
meaning to accrue, one’s rationality must be substantially engaged, e.g. by working 
hard and in a sophisticated manner, and it must be contoured towards a particular 
object, namely, one fundamental to human life. 
For example, what is responsible for much of a given person’s life are the 
choices she has made in light of reflection informed by the norms and values of the 
community in which she been reared. Mandela’s life was great insofar as he 
struggled in largely just ways for more than 30 years to overcome apartheid, which 
had greatly stunted and more generally degraded these conditions on the part of 
many black people. His life would have been much less important had he, say, 
instead trimmed many of their toenails or rescued them from chronic halitosis, 
conditions that have little import for other facets of a characteristic human life.   
  For another example, what accounts for much about the human environment 
are space and time (among many other conditions). Einstein’s life was significant to 
the extent that he discovered how these operate with respect to the universe in a way 
it would not have been had he instead apprehended the number of redheads in 
Beiseker, Alberta, a proposition that would have explained few other propositions 
with regard to the place in which human beings live.5  
 For a last illustration, Guernica conferred notable meaning on Picasso’s life 
insofar as it is about war, a condition that explains much about the development of 
the human species. One could not apprehend much about human history were one 
to leave out discussion of large-scale conflict, quite unlike, e.g. facts about the 
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number of nostrils or toes we have, which, again, account for little of our 
characteristic experience. 
 At this point, consider why I had labelled these explanations ‘non-
consequentialist’ and ones that involve ‘self-transcendence’, both of which construals 
Landau doubts are apt. Although I do not believe much hangs on these 
characterizations and I would not want to grasp onto too them too firmly, I do suspect 
that they are fair and useful ways to differentiate my view from at least large classes 
of rivals.  
 Landau maintains that my view is in fact consequentialist insofar as I clearly 
do maintain that the actual consequences of one’s actions are directly relevant to the 
amount of meaning conferred on one’s life (511–512). I maintain that success 
matters for meaning in a way that it does not for morality. Trying to make an innocent 
person’s life better and employing a strategy that is likely to be successful is sufficient 
in my view for permissible, and perhaps morally praiseworthy, action. In contrast, 
while I agree that this would confer some meaning on one’s life, much more meaning 
would accrue, I submit, insofar as the other person were in fact benefited thereby. 
So, I readily accept that part of what explains the great meaning to be found in 
Mandela’s and Mother Teresa’s lives is the fact that they succeeded in improving 
others’ lives. And this leads Landau to question my ‘non-consequentialist’ label for 
the fundamentality account. 
 There are at least three respects in which (FT1) indeed falls under the heading 
‘non-consequentialist’, despite implying that, ceteris paribus, the better the 
consequences one has produced (at least in certain ways), the more meaningful 
one’s life. First, the relevant consequences must be those caused by one’s rational 
nature, and by its intense exercise; the results must at least be foreseen (if not 
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intended) as well as hard to achieve, for substantial meaning to accrue. Unlike the 
‘good cause’ theory of meaning in life recently introduced to the literature (Smuts 
(2013)), utterly accidental benefits would not count. Nor would the benefits of merely 
using a ‘result machine’ (Nozick (1974), 42–45), or at least not much. 
Second, the fundamentality theory is meant to include ‘constraints’ on the 
production of good consequences, something I did not emphasize in the article 
Landau discusses (but see Metz (2013), 187–191). Many intuitions indicate that 
using particularly degrading actions as a means undercuts the ability of improved 
long-term well-being one has brought about to confer meaning on one’s life. For a 
doctor intentionally to kill someone with a cold in order to save five other good lives 
with his organs confers no, or very little, meaning, in contrast to the views of a classic 
consequentialist who, again, cares not about the means employed to bring about the 
good. Consider, for instance, a plain reading of Peter Singer’s account of how to 
maximize meaning in life ((1993), 314–335).  
 Third, and something I also did not mention in the initial article, implicit in the 
fundamentality theory is the ‘agent-relative’ idea that where, and not merely how (à la 
the first two points), one realizes the good makes a difference, again contra Singer, 
who is explicit that acting from the ‘point of view of the universe’ is what makes one’s 
life matter most ((1993), 314–335). To illustrate what I have in mind,6 think of a 
married couple, both of whom are talented, indeed so talented that they have 
precisely calculated that the best results would be produced in the long run if the wife 
stayed home and supported the husband in his professional career, more than if they 
both worked and shared the domestic labour. Suppose that the amount of extra 
excellence or virtue realized by the husband through his work would be marginal 
relative to the other option. On a consequentialist view, the higher the overall amount 
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of excellence one has produced, the more meaningful one’s life, entailing that, to 
maximize meaning in her life, the wife ought to stay home and support the husband. 
But that is counterintuitive, and meant to be ruled out by (FT1). Even if the wife had 
worked hard at home to enable her husband to promote excellence in himself and 
others, to a slightly higher degree than that of which she were capable, she would 
have had more meaning in her life if she had instead exhibited quite a lot of 
excellence in herself. (FT1)’s emphasis on one’s rational nature is supposed to 
capture that intuition. 
 However, I worry about the way I initially phrased the fundamentality theory as 
strictly focused on orienting ‘our’ rational nature, which might suggest that it is only by 
exercising one’s own rationality that meaning can accrue. I also want to account for 
the intuition that helping others to exercise their rationality in the relevant ways can 
be meaning-conferring. The wife above would obtain some meaning by virtue of 
helping her husband exhibit virtue, and surely being a lecturer can be (very) 
meaningful, and not merely because one has utilized one’s own deliberative faculties, 
but also because one has enabled (and cajoled) students to use theirs. To make that 
clear, as well as to make explicit the deontological aspects, I suggest working with 
the following:  
(FT2) The good, the true, and the beautiful confer great meaning on life insofar 
as one, without violating certain moral constraints against degrading sacrifice, 
employs one’s reason and in ways that positively orient rationality in a 
substantial way towards fundamental conditions of human existence. 
This version makes it more clear that meaning comes in the first instance by using 
one’s own intelligence in the relevant ways, and can also come by getting others to 
do so, ideally consequent to that.  
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 Supposing, then, that the ‘non-consequentialist’ label is reasonable, what 
about ‘self-transcendence’? By the latter I had had in mind views according to which 
one’s life is more meaningful, the more one goes beyond some feature of one’s 
nature, either by actualizing some other feature in oneself or connecting up with 
something outside of oneself. Views associated with Aristotle, for example, are called 
‘self-realization’ accounts, according to which one’s basic justificatory reason for 
action is developing one’s higher nature or moving away from one’s lower. I had 
something similar in mind with the fundamentality theory. By this view, one’s life is 
more meaningful, the more one employs one’s rational nature in a vigorous and 
intense manner and does so in relation to fundamental conditions of human life, a 
view that contrasts with, say, getting one’s own desires satisfied (Taylor (1970), 319–
334; Trisel (2002)) or maximizing others’ pleasure in the long run (see also Irving 
Singer (1996), 101–140), theories that are salient in the literature.  
 Landau notes I am implicitly committed to the view that creating a work of art 
or discovering a new fact is a greater instance of self-transcendence than is merely 
apprehending one of these existents, and he is not clear how that might be the case 
(507–508). My response is two-fold. First, exercising one’s rationality in original ways 
is intuitively to get farther away from one’s animal or lower nature than is merely 
using it to copy what someone else has done. In addition to the process, there is, 
second, the product. The formation of something that had not existed before, 
consequent to the use of imagination, is to change the environment in ways that 
nothing else on the planet can and so is also intuitively higher. However, if these 
explanations seem forced, I would not mind dropping the title of ‘self-transcendence’.  
 There is much more that could be said to clarify and to motivate the 
fundamentality theory of what makes life particularly meaningful, at least insofar as 
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that is constituted by the good, the true, and the beautiful. However, this analysis 
should be enough for the reader to grasp the import of Landau’s two most important 
criticisms of it.  
 Fundamentality as not sufficient for great meaning 
  Landau’s first major objection to the fundamentality theory is that contouring 
rationality towards fundamental conditions is not always enough to obtain great 
meaning. He points out that those ‘who just study or understand’ (507) the works of 
Einstein or Picasso are positively orienting or contouring their intelligence towards 
fundamental conditions, but are not intuitively obtaining great meaning thereby.  
Landau also notes that some people, with somewhat lesser native abilities or 
education, might be working very hard indeed simply to grasp the basics of what 
these giants have accomplished, and so could count as exercising their rationality ‘in 
a substantial way’ as per the theory. But, again, Landau maintains, it would be only 
Einstein or Picasso who has the great meaning, not the average Joe or plain Jane 
trying to make sense of their accomplishments.  
 I do not at all question Landau’s intuitions,7 and so must either clarify or revise 
the theory in order to account for them. As Landau notes (507), I have been aware of 
this issue and initially suggested the strategy of construing the fundamentality theory 
to require an advancement, so as to differentiate the great meaning from the not so 
great (Metz (2011), 404–405). That would seem to distinguish Einstein and Picasso, 
on the one hand, from the first-year physics or art student, on the other.  
 And here is where things get particularly interesting. Landau objects that such 
a reply is inadequate for failing to capture the respects in which great meaning can 
come from preventing a decline. Preventing an asteroid from striking the earth, curing 
HIV/AIDS, stopping global warming, and myriad other ways of reducing the bad 
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would be no less meaning-conferring than producing the good. However, speaking of 
an ‘advancement’ as the key to great meaning to Landau suggests only the latter 
condition.  
 As a first response, it is worth considering whether I may plausibly understand 
the concept of advancement to include the idea of preventing a decline. In particular, 
one might suggest that one makes an advancement insofar as the state of affairs of 
which one is the (proximate) cause is much better than what would have obtained in 
the absence of one’s intervention. Just as without Picasso, we would not have had 
Guernica and other masterpieces, so without the cure for HIV/AIDS, we would not 
have had many more (good) lives.  
 However, this principle entails that one would get no credit for doing 
something that someone else would have done had one not. It is no defence against 
murder to say that if you had not killed the innocent person for the insurance money, 
someone else would have. One can be liable for blame for an action, even if 
someone else would have performed the same type at about the same time. 
Similarly, one can be liable for praise for an action, even if someone else would have 
done it. An inventor can be rightly admired for (and proud of) being the first to have 
created an ingenious gadget, even if someone else was hot on her heels. It is 
therefore a strike against my suggested understanding of advancement that it entails 
that a person’s life would be no more meaningful for curing HIV/AIDS, if someone 
else would have done it soon after.  
 It is natural at this point instead to propose the following: one makes an 
‘advancement’ in the relevant sense if and only if one is the proximate cause of a 
state of affairs that is much better than what would have obtained in the absence of 
the type of one’s intervention. This construal of advancement avoids the problem 
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facing the initial version, while also capturing Landau’s solid intuition that preventing 
a decline can make one’s existence significant. 
However, as it stands, this principle appears to have the odd implication that 
one could obtain great meaning in life merely by pressing a button that diverts an 
incoming asteroid, even in the case where a billion other people would have readily 
pressed the button had you not. Although some meaning might accrue for being the 
button-presser, it would be a stretch to say that it was great meaning, here.  
 As a final response, I believe that the problem is probably resolved upon 
considering in more detail not what ‘advancement’ means, but rather what is involved 
in speaking of exercising reason ‘in a substantial way’, both of which are plausibly 
essential for great meaning in life. Landau, as I indicated above, reads the latter 
phrase as relative to the capacities of a specific individual, so that someone who is 
on the dull and uneducated side can be said to have exercised her intelligence 
‘substantially’ if she struggles a lot. However, I mean to exclude such a relativist 
sense, for it instead appears to be the difficulty of a project not merely for the one 
engaging in it, but also for characteristic human beings8, that is relevant to whether 
an action can confer great meaning or not.  
 In rough summation, neither hard work that fails to advance, nor advancement 
without hard work, is sufficient for great meaning. The fundamentality theory should 
be understood to require both, this way:  
(FT3) The good, the true, and the beautiful confer great meaning on life insofar 
as one, without violating certain moral constraints against degrading sacrifice, 
employs one’s reason and in ways that positively orient rationality well beyond 
characteristic human functioning towards fundamental conditions of human 
existence and thereby make an advancement compared to what would have 
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obtained in the absence of the type of one’s rational engagement (cf. Metz 
(2013), 235–237). 
The principle is losing any hope of becoming a slogan, but is gaining in precision and 
plausibility. (FT3) can now be seen to provide a plausible sufficiency condition for 
great meaning, at least in relation to the reasons Landau has given for doubting that.  
Fundamentality as not necessary for great meaning 
Landau’s second major criticism of the fundamentality theory, and one that still 
prima facie applies to (FT3), is that one can obtain great meaning in life by directing 
one’s rational nature (or that of others) towards objects that are not fundamental in 
the sense I have expounded. According to him, at least on some occasions, 
contouring one’s intelligence towards merely necessary conditions for human 
existence can confer great meaning on a person’s life. 
Here, Landau again uses a clever dialectical manoeuvre, invoking some of my 
own examples against me. In particular, Landau contends that the meaningfulness to 
be found in the cases of the incoming asteroid and of Mother Teresa are best 
explained by the bare fact of saving human life (509–510). Life is obviously a 
necessary condition for a wide array of aspects of human existence, but I, with 
Landau, deny that it is a fundamental one, for it causes or explains very little of them.  
Landau readily agrees that not every advancement consequent to the intense 
positive orientation of one’s intelligence towards necessary conditions for a variety of 
facets of human existence is a good candidate for great meaning, and he concludes 
merely that both fundamental conditions and at least some, as yet unspecified, 
necessary ones are the relevant objects of rationality (510–511). In the following, I 
aim to provide good reason to stick with my simpler formulation, which appeals to 
fundamentality alone. 
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Let us think more carefully about Mother Teresa. Consider, first, Mother 
Teresa*, who prevents a great many human beings from dying, but foresees that 
they will merely remain comatose for the rest of their lives. Second, think about 
Mother Teresa^, who again prevents a great many human beings from dying, but 
does so in the awareness that they will consequently suffer excruciating torture for 
the rest of their lives. My intuition is that there is no meaning here, or at the very least 
no great meaning.  
These cases strongly suggest it is not the bare fact of saving life, a necessary 
condition for a wide array of facts about human beings, that is meaning-conferring in 
the original case of Mother Teresa; for, if it were, then we would judge there to be 
great meaning in the above two permutations, but we do not. Saving lives that one 
knows will suffer a fate worse than, or even no better than, death does not confer 
much, if any, meaning on one’s life.9  
There is clearly more that is required, which, I believe, is enough to rebut 
Landau’s motivation for postulating the idea that contouring intelligence towards what 
is merely necessary for many aspects of human existence can constitute great 
meaning in life. However, while that negative rebuttal is welcome, so far as it goes, it 
is not yet to provide positive reason to think that fundamentality is doing the 
explanatory work, a claim I now seek to buttress.  
What I propose is that what differentiates the original case of Mother Teresa 
from Mother Teresa* and Mother Teresa^ is that only the former is protecting 
conditions that are responsible for much else about a characteristic human person’s 
life. What are those? Moving beyond what I had to say in my initial article, I have 
come to believe that they are centrally a matter of choosing in light of reflection on 
the norms salient in one’s context (cf. Metz (2013), 227–228, 236–237). What is 
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causally responsible for a large degree of the course of a representative person’s 
life? Roughly, the answer is: her acting on the non-derivative principles and values 
that she has adopted consequent to engagement with her community. Such end-
pursuit is what is missing in the cases of being comatose and tortured, and what is 
present in the case of our stereotypical understanding of Mother Teresa, who does 
not merely save many lives, but saves many lives that are reasonably expected to go 
on their merry way, as it were. 
Conclusion: From the classic triad to the ultimate one 
 I close this article by addressing religious issues of a sort more narrow than I 
have so far. Up to this point I have defended a secular theory of what makes a life 
(very) meaningful, which is clearly ‘religious’ or ‘spiritual’ only in a broad sense of 
addressing some of the greatest values in human life, namely, the good, the true, 
and the beautiful insofar as they can merit great admiration and awe. However, I 
have not spoken of properly supernaturalist themes yet, and I want to draw the 
attention of readers to the implications of the fundamentality theory for them. 
 In particular, I conclude by highlighting the respect in which the fundamentality 
theory can plausibly account for the ability of God as conceived in the monotheistic 
tradition to confer great meaning on our lives. Unlike nearly all theories of life’s 
meaning in the field, mine occupies what might be reasonably considered to be 
middle ground. On the one hand, supernaturalist theories typically maintain that if 
God did not exist, then life would be meaningless,10 while, on the other, naturalist 
theories fail to acknowledge the respect in which God could be a source of 
meaning.11 My view is different, entailing that a (very) meaningful life is possible 
without God, while also accounting for the judgement that God could be largely 
constitutive of a (very) meaningful life, if God were to exist. 
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 The issue is what in our actual world is fundamental to our environment and 
our characteristic lives as individuals and as a species. If the world is merely 
physical, then it will be certain physical facts that are causally responsible for much 
about our existence, and this is the form of the theory that I normally adopt. However, 
if our world included a person beyond space and time who were the originator and 
sustainer of the physical universe, then He would count as fundamental to our 
environment and the course of our lives. God would be the ultimate CEO, one 
overseeing the operations of all of existence (to return to an analogy I used earlier to 
illustrate fundamentality), such that orienting one’s life towards Him would be the 
central way to live a profound, rather than trivial, life.  
 One might wonder how such an account of God’s centrality to meaning in life 
squares with the usual route by which one appeals to theistic considerations about 
this value, namely, as a perfect being who has laid down moral rules for us springing 
from His nature. My suggestion is to recall that creativity is a perfection, perhaps the 
highest one (on which see Morris (1990)). If God existed, He would be fundamental 
to much (on some views, everything) about our lives, precisely in virtue of having 
been the creative source of it.  
Hence, the fundamentality view should be attractive to both theists and 
atheists. It can be seen as interesting value-theoretic common ground among those 
who have deep metaphysical disputes. Although debate continues about what is 
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1 All abbreviated citations in the text refer to this one. 
2 So I comprehensively recount and critically address in Metz (2013). 
3 Although notice that the loss of only a single person would be enough to impair the 
firm at CEO level, but not at the janitorial. 
4 Similar remarks apply to a dreaded ‘constipation theory’ of meaning in life, 
according to which we could not exist or do much if we could not defecate, advanced 
as an attempted reductio against the fundamentality theory by Anna Alexandrova. In 
reply, I note that such picks out a necessary condition for human existence and not a 
fundamental one, which I believe explains why it is not a promising view. 
5 See Hurka (1993), 155 for the example, but not the same explanation of the lack of 
importance (albeit one worth taking seriously).  
6 This example is taken from Metz (2013), 195–196. 
7 Although some might, particularly those who believe that the amount of meaning in 
a person’s life is a function of the extent to which she has exercised her particular 
abilities and opportunities, suggested by Adams (2002). 
8 Cf. James (2005), 437–440, who focuses on the average for human beings, a 
statistical notion, as opposed to what is characteristic of them, which is a different 
notion. For discussion of their different implications, see Metz (2013), 150–154. 
9 I first suggested this argumentative strategy in Metz (2013), 237–238. 
10 But see Mawson (2013) for a different interpretation of the literature. I have 
implicitly already responded to him on this score in Metz (2013), 106–108. 
11 Hooker (2008), 199 is the only exception that comes to mind beyond Metz (2013), 
158–160, 220, 232–233. 
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12 I am grateful to Iddo Landau for having composed his article and corresponded 
with me about it and related topics, as well as to an anonymous referee for Religious 
Studies for written comments.  
